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Introduction 
For an ‘innovation union’ to emerge, ‘systems’ of innovation are needed so that new knowledge and 
innovation can diffuse throughout the European economy. Systems and eco-systems of innovation 
(sectoral, regional, and national) require the presence of dynamic links between the different actors 
and institutions (firms, financial institutions, research/education, public sector funds, intermediary 
institutions) as well as horizontal links within organisations and institutions (Freeman, 1995).   
What, however, has not been given enough attention in the debate about the different actors and 
institutions required for innovation-led growth, is the exact role that each actor in the system plays 
along the ‘bumpy’ and complex risk landscape (Mazzucato, 2011). Considering these roles more 
explicitly, allows us to consider the degree to which the division of labour in risk taking is matched or 
not by a division of rewards, which one would expect if there is a risk-return relationship. It also helps 
us to better understand whether the eco-system is creating the right incentives. Is it the case that 
because some actors are putting in a lot, other actors have been given less incentives to do their share?  
Market failure theory discusses ‘risk’ in terms of the ‘wedge’ between private and social returns, which 
may arise from the ‘public’ nature of goods (which limits the ability of private actors to appropriate 
returns), or different types of externalities (Laffont, 2008). This is the classical argument that justifies 
State spending on basic research. However, the mission oriented investments, which make up about 
75% of public sector investments in innovation in many advanced economies, cannot be understood 
within the market failure perspective. Missions, such as putting a man on the moon, to developing the 
internet (which was done in DARPA, an agency of the US Department of Defence) involve both basic 
and applied research, and are driven not by the dynamics of the private/social ‘wedge’ but by direct 
objectives of the government. Indeed, the very heavy funding of the US pharmaceutical industry arises 
from the US government mission, through its National Institutes of Health, to “ seek fundamental 
knowledge about the nature and behaviour of living systems and the application of that knowledge to 
enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce the burdens of illness and disability”.  The budget of the NIH 
has reached 400 billion over the last decade, with 31 billion in 2012 (see Fig. 1).  
 







At a more micro level, Block and Keller (2011) find that between 1971 and 2006, 77 out of the most 
important 88 innovations (rated by R&D Magazine’s annual awards) were found to have been fully 
dependent on federal support, especially, but not only, in the early phases.  And all the major ‘general 
purpose technologies’, from aviation to the internet, owe their core funding to the public sector 
(Ruttan, 2006). 
 
These examples are important because it is often argued that what is missing in Europe is the 
availability of ‘private’ finance willing to fund the radical technologies, as well as the specific phases in 
which risk is highest such as the ‘death valley’ stage of the innovation cycle.  Yet what is not said is that 
private finance works well especially when it rides the wave of State investments, as it has done in the 
USA.  Indeed, all the major technologies that make the iPhone so ‘smart’ are funded by public sector 
organisations: GPS, the internet, touch screen display, and even the latest voice activated SIRI personal 
assistant—all owe their funding to the State (Mazzucato, 2012 forthcoming, Breakthrough Institute, 
2012). ‘Geniuses’ like Steve Jobs, and the presence of private VC, are fundamental, but without the 
State funding of both basic and applied research in the core radical technologies, it is not clear whether 
the VC model would work at all, and whether individuals like Jobs would have much to add their 
‘design’ talent to.  
 
And it is not just about research. While many associate risk capital with either business angels or VC, 
in reality in many countries, including in Silicon Valley part of the USA, it has been public not private 
funds which have filled the high risk funding gap. In the USA, the SBIR programme which began in 
1982, provides almost $2.5 billion annually to small firms. It is administered by 11 government 
agencies and divided between phase 1 ($150,000) and 2 ($1 million). And as VC has become 
increasingly short-termist, pursuing returns in a 3-5 year period, the SBIR programme has had to step 
up and often funds firms that VC is too risk averse for. As can be seen in Fig. 2, as VC has become 
increasingly short-termist, pursuing capital gains, and seeking early exit through an IPO, SBIR has had 
to step up its risk finance (Block, 2012). Indeed, Pisano (2006) has argued that the short-termism of 
venture capital makes it an inappropriate model to drive innovation in science-based sectors, such as 









A dysfunctional eco-system: socialized risk, privatized rewards? 
Interestingly, one of the results of this eco-system in which the State plays a leading role beyond that 
which has been attributed to it by either the market failure perspective of the national systems of 
innovation perspective, in the various frameworks reviewed above, has been a fall in the investments 
actually made by private firms in the innovation process. As argued by Angell (2004), the NIH has been 
much more ‘risk-taking’ than private large pharmaceutical companies, with up to 75% of the most 
radical new drugs (new molecular entities with ‘priority’ rating) coming out of public not private labs. 
Yet, as the NIH has been spending more and more on the knowledge base that underpins the biotech 
and pharmaceutical industry, the large pharma companies themselves have been spending an 
increasing amount on repurchasing their own stock. In 2011, along with $6.2 billion in dividends, 
Pfizer repurchased $9.0 billion in stock, equivalent to 90 percent of its net income and 99 percent of its 
R&D expenditures.  Amgen, the largest dedicated biopharma company, has repurchased stock in every 
year since 1992, for a total of $42.2 billion through 2011, including $8.3 billion in 2011. Since 2002 the 
cost of Amgen’s stock repurchases has surpassed the company’s R&D expenditures in every year 
except 2004, and for the period 1992-2011 was equal to fully 115 percent of R&D outlays and 113 
percent of net income (source: Lazonick and Tulum, 2011).  
The problem is widely diffused: in the last decade, Fortune 500 companies have spent $3billion in 
share buybacks. While they claim that this is due to the lack of new opportunities, the reality is that the 
most expensive (eg capital intensive) investments in new opportunities (with high market and 
technological risk) are being made by the public sector. In this sense, the problem is not one of 
‘crowding out’ as is sometimes argued—because in fact the State is investing in areas that the private 
sector has chosen not to invest in.  
And unfortunately the same problem seems to be appearing now in the emerging cleantechnology 
sector. On the one hand in 2010, the US American Energy Innovation Council (AEIC) asked the US 
government to increase its spending on clean technology by three times to $16 billion annually, with 
an additional $1 billion given to the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy (ARPA-E). On the 
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other hand, they have together spent $237 billion on stock repurchases between 2001-2010. The 
major directors of the AEIC hail from companies with collective 2011 net incomes of $37 billion and 
R&D expenditures of approximately $16 billion. That they believe their own companies enormous 
resources are inadequate to foster greater clean technology innovation is indicative of the state's role 
as the first driver of innovation (Mazzucato, 2013 forthcoming) 
But the question arises whether this heavy funding has allowed big corporations to think they can earn 
the same or even higher profits while themselves putting in less resources into innovation. Indeed, 
pharmaceutical companies have publicly announced their rethinking of whether they need to be doing 
basic research at all, given that most of their knowledge comes from either small biotech or publicly 
funded labs (or publicly funded research in private/public universities). And they react with their feet, 
with companies like Pfizer closing down labs in countries where there is less public R&D (eg the UK 
where the R&D/GDP spend it low), going to countries where there is more (US, with a 2.7% R&D/GDP 
and heavy NIH).  
Correcting this dysfunctional system is key if we want to prevent the same dynamic in greentech that 
has characterized areas like biotech. The biotechnology industry is one where most of the VC backed 
companies remain productless, yet make much money for the venture capitalists when they exit via an 
IPO.  
So if the State is so important for funding high risk investments in innovation, and given the commonly 
accepted relationship between risks and returns in finance, it could be argued that more thinking is 
required on whether and how the state should earn back a more direct return on its risky investments. 
That is, rather than worrying so much about the picking winners problem, more thinking is needed 
about how to reward the winning investments so they can cover some of the eventual losses--which 
are inevitable as innovation is so deeply uncertain, in the Knightian sense (Knight, 1921).  
Put provocatively, had the State earned back even just 1% from the investments it made in the 
Internet, there would be much more today to invest in green tech. Or put another way, is it right that 
the National Science Foundation which funded the algorithm behind Google, received nothing back 
when Google made billions (Block and Keller, 2011)?       
Many argue that it is inappropriate to consider direct returns to the State because the State already 
earns back for its investments, indirectly via the taxation system. There are three arguments against 
this reasoning: (1) tax evasion (legal and illegal) is common and realistically will not disappear; (2) 
global movements of capital mean that the particular region (which could also include the EC) funding 
the innovation might not reap the benefits in terms of local job creation, the taxation question remains 
an open question (see the case of Apple below). And (3) investments in innovation are different from 
spending, on say education. The former embody a great degree of risk, similar to that experienced by 
private venture capital, with one in 10 investments earning a return. If the State is being asked to make 
such investments (which it undoubtedly has been making and increasingly so), it is necessary for it to 
cover its inevitable losses when those arise.  
Indeed, the case of Apple computers is a case in point. Apple received its early stage funding from the 
US government’s SBIR programme, and all the technologies which make the iPhone ‘smart’ are also 
State funded: the internet, GPS, touchscreen display and the latest voice activated SIRI personal 
assistant. Yet Apple has used practices commonly used which have resulted in a much lower tax bill for 
the US government. According to Duhigg and Kocieniewski (2012), in order to avoid taxes, Apple 
formed a subsidiary in Reno, Nevada, where there is no corporate income or capital gain tax. 
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Creatively naming the company, Braeburn Capital, Apple used it to channel a portion of its U.S. sales, 
instead of including them in the revenues it reported in California, where its headquarters are located. 
Apple reportedly saved $2.5-billion in taxes with this scheme a very large number given the $9.2 
billion dollar state deficit California experienced in 2009. In other words, the entire state budget deficit 
would have been significantly reduced (by more than 25%) if Apple had fully reported its U.S. 
revenues in the state where a significant portion of its value (discovery, design, sales, marketing, etc.) 
was created and achieved (Duhigg and Kocieniewski, 2012). These facts simply reinforce that the tax 
system is not one that can be relied on for recouping investments, in this case by the State of 
California, in risky innovation.  
Reaping back a (direct) return 
Where technological breakthroughs have occurred as a result of targeted state interventions, there is 
potential for the state, over time, to reap some of the financial rewards, by retaining ownership over a 
small proportion of the intellectual property created. This is not to say the state should ever have 
exclusive license or hold a large enough proportion of the value of an innovation that it deters a wider 
spread of its application – the role of government is not to run commercial enterprises, but to spark 
innovation elsewhere. But government should explore whether it is possible to own a slither of the 
value it has created, which over time could create significant value and then be reinvested into growth 
generating investments. 
For example, as discussed briefly above, three-quarters of the new molecular bio-pharmaceutical 
entities owe their creation to publicly funded laboratories. Yet in the past ten years, the top ten 
companies in this industry have made more in profits than the rest of the Fortune 500 companies 
combined. The industry also enjoys great tax advantages: its R&D costs are deductible, and so are 
many of its massive marketing expenses, some of which are counted as R&D (Angells, 2008). After 
taking on most of the R&D bill, the state often gives away the outputs at a rock bottom rate. For 
example, Taxol, the cancer drug discovered by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), is sold by 
Bristol-Myers Squibb for $20,000 per year’s dose, 20 times the manufacturing cost. Yet, the company 
agreed to pay the NIH only 0.5 per cent in royalties for the drug. 
Similarly, where an applied technological breakthrough is directly financed by the government, it 
should in return be able to extract a small royalty from its application. Again, this should not be 
sufficient as to prohibit its dissemination throughout the economy, or to disincentivise the innovators 
from taking the risk in the first place. Instead it makes the policy of spending taxpayers’ money to light 
the innovative spark more sustainable, by enabling part of the financial gains from so doing to be 
recycled directly back into the programme over time. 
Thus rather than worrying so much about the picking winners problem, more thinking is needed about 
how to reward the winning investments so they can both cover some of the eventual losses (which are 
inevitable in the innovation game) and also raise funds for future investments.   
There are various possibilities for considering a direct return to the state for its investments in 
innovation. One is to make sure that loans and guarantees that are handed out by the State to business 
do not come without strings attached. Loans as well as grants could have conditions, like income 
contingent loans, similar to that of student loans. If and when a company makes profits above a certain 
threshold, after it has received a loan/grant from the state, it should be required to pay back a portion. 
This is of course not rocket science but it goes against some deep-seated assumptions. And currently, 
with budget deficits under so much pressure, it is no longer possible to ignore the issue.  
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Besides income contingent loans there is the possibility of the state retaining equity in the companies 
that it supports. Indeed, this does occur in many countries, such as Finland, where SITRA, one of 
Finland’s public funding agencies, retained equity in its early stage investments in Nokia.  Exactly the 
type of early stage investments that VC has increasingly shied away from. Yet state equity in private 
companies is feared in countries like the USA and the UK (and those countries copying the Anglo-
Saxon model) for fear that the next step is…communism. Yet the point is that the most successful 
capitalist economies have had active states, making such risky investments, and we have been too 
quick to criticise them when things go wrong (e.g. Concorde) and too slow to reward them when 
things go right (egg the internet).  
Other than income contingent loans, and retained equity, there is of course a more direct tool which is 
a state investment bank. Indeed, while many have argued the importance of a State investment bank 
for the needs of counter-cyclical lending (Skidelsky 2012), another reason why they are important is 
precisely to reap back a return in order to fund future investments. In 2012 KfW, the German state 
investment bank, reported £2 billion in profits, while most private banks are in the red, with many 
experiencing falling profits (KFW, 2011). And indeed, if/when the state institution is run by people 
who not only believe in the power of the state but also have the expertise around innovation, then the 
result produces a high reward. A perfect example is the Brazilian state development bank BNDES in 
Brazil which has been actively investing in innovation in both cleantech and biotechnology, and 
making hefty profits from the investment. In 2010 it made 21% return on equity (ROE), most of which 
was reinvested by the treasury into the economy (e.g. in health and education). The percentage 
retained by BNDES was reinvested in key new sectors, focussing specifically on the death valley stage 
of biotechnology in which private VC is so absent.   
Conclusion   
Understanding the state as lead risk-taker, opens the question about how such risk-taking can reap 
back a return. While many have been quick to blame the government when it fails to ‘pick winners’, 
they have been much less quick to reward it when it succeeds. It is argued here that a framework is 
required both for understanding the risk-taking (beyond the risk-averseness argument in the market 
failure approach) and for understanding how the collective system of innovation (emphasized by the 
national systems of innovation approach) maps also into a system of rewards. Getting the balance 
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